According to the U.S. Department of State, the purpose behind the six-day visit of U.S. President George W. Bush to Africa was to tout a $360 million, five-year plan to assist African nations in fighting AIDS, a mosaic of tropical diseases, and poverty. He also challenged other members of the G8 to launch similar programs and to contribute an additional $650 million to the cause.
Bush’s sudden philanthropy raised incredulous eye brows across the continent. African Political opposition leaders, although appreciative to receive the funds, remain suspicious. African people across the continent still see and smell the wolf behind the grandmother disguise. A Tanzanian newspaper headline asserted that Bush’s mission in Africa is to negotiate the establishment of U.S. military bases. Bush, of course, avoided discussing AFRICOM (African Command). He, nonetheless, perceived how anxious Africans are over an expending U.S. military presence on their continent. The tension reached the pinnacle when Ghanaian President John Kufuor brought up the issue unabashedly saying: “You’re not going to build any bases in Ghana.” “Nor do we want to,” Bush responded.
To journalists in Ghana, Bush stated: “I want to dispel the notion that all of a sudden America is bringing all kinds of military to Africa. It’s just simply not true.” Bush previously stated that the purpose of AFRICOM is “to enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and to promote the … development of health, education, democracy and economic growth.” The command, currently temporarily headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, will coordinate and deconflict virtually all U.S. military and security interests throughout the continent.
Within the framework of the African Contingency Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and other programs, U.S. military presence is already established in such states as Niger, Burundi, and Cameroon where U.S. personnel are training African peacekeeping forces, in Congo assisting local military officials develop protocols for prosecuting sex crimes, and in Chad delivering much needed supplies to refugees; U.S. Navy Seabees are building and painting classrooms in Senegal; Army and Air Force medical personnel are training with their counterparts from Djibouti. Other U.S. elements are involved as well; the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will be training African nations on how to monitor their fishing industry and U.S.AID is funding food delivery in Ghana. This flurry of activity is happening under the auspices of AFRICOM.
Then why is AFRICOM such a controversial issue? How does the Bush administration, which after decades of obliviousness, explain its sudden interest in bolstering the African economic and social reforms with its well-funded programs and know-how? How can the Bush administration bring democracy to nations governed by oppressive dictators under its protection?
Let me first reiterate the obvious: the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) (once known as the War Department) is a highly-trained, well-equipped, and professionally-led military institution that does not engage in long-term peace keeping operations, much less social and economic reforms. It seems counterintuitive.
It is not.
The White House and the DoD finally realized that global terrorism finds a welcoming niche in poverty stricken, under-developed, politically conflicted African nations, especially the Moslem ones. Positive involvement in Africa is a national security issue for the U.S. Additionally, Africa produces 30% of the world’s uranium supply and 20% of its total petroleum; Nigeria alone exports as much oil to the U.S. each year as does Saudi Arabia and by 2015 will provide more than 25% of U.S. energy imports. AFRICOM then is deemed by the Bush administration a strategic necessity in its war against terrorism and for the protection of its national interests, meaning energy producing countries. U.S. objectives in Africa would be unattainable in an environment of instability. A recent UN report indicated that between 1990 and 2006, 5 million people have been killed in Africa as a result of internal conflicts. The increasing presence of al Qaeda which is maximizing on the fact that some African regimes do not control most of the regions under their governance makes it all the more imperative for the U.S. to have a presence in the continent. The Sahel is one such region where lawlessness and poverty provide al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb with a relatively safe environment to regroup, train and arm its fighters, and plan its operations against North African and European countries. Numerous intelligence reports indicate that the Maghreb and the Sahel are heavily infiltrated by violent and dangerous radical Islamist groups made up mostly of Algerian Salafists and other Islamic radical groups kicked out of Algeria. Last year suicide attacks and recent arrests in Morocco are clear indicators the threat has expended exponentially.
The primary mission of this merger of “soft” and “hard” components of U.S. power that is AFRICOM is to advance stability in Africa, even if it is a status quo. The foreign policy the U.S. administration is advancing in Africa has benefited from previous tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Although it protects the governance of despots for the sake of stability, the U.S. seeks the endorsement of the African population by funding social and economic reforms directly and positively impacting their way of life. This strategy will take some time to implement in North African nations where anti-U.S. sentiments are deeply rooted within the population.
MOROCCO, FRONT AND CENTER
One of the first African countries to offer hosting the new African Command immediately after its creation was publicized by the White House in February 6, 2007, was Morocco. It did so as part of its expanded military cooperation with the U.S. which considers the Kingdom the most stable country on the African continent. An unidentified Moroccan official justified the country’s bid saying: “We have the infrastructure as well as the society that accepts foreigners.” In addition to annual U.S. military exercises and simulations conducted as part of bilateral and regional military and counter –insurgency efforts, Morocco has been logistically supporting U.S. real world operations by providing access to its airbases and ports (and let’s not forget, its detention facilities and their assigned torturers), a Congressional Research Service report entitled “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa” stated.
There are a number of reasons why the White House would consider Morocco as a likely home to AFRICOM. The location of the command will determine its strategic influence and effectiveness in combating terrorism and stabilizing the continent. By virtue of its geographic location, Morocco, not Algeria, Libya or Tunisia, is a key interface between sub-Saharan African and Europe and is able to play a key security role in sea lane security in what the U.S. now considers the most important sea lanes of communications in the world. The Bush administration sees Morocco as a stable state that is increasingly operating by a Western-style democratic system, therefore a politically viable option. Additionally, Morocco has always functioned, socially and politically, as a natural extension of Europe. The U.S. assesses that Morocco has an effective control of the African littoral of the Strait of Gibraltar, a strategically critical maritime trade sea lane; this control, the U.S. judges, is paramount to combating the transition of terrorists into Europe. This assessment is debatable considering the unadulterated drug and human trafficking operations taking place across the Strait. Morocco is also considered to have the best potential for the oil and gas pipeline links from much of sub-Saharan Africa up to, and across, the Mediterranean and a strong potential for domestic oil and gas exploitation, as well as the provision of other resources to the U.S. Market. The U.S. options in North Africa are rather limited. Libya is not a possible venue for historical reasons. Algeria’s lack of cooperation disappointed the U.S.; in a Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI) organized and funded with a $100 million annually by the U.S. department of State and designed for the setting of mechanisms of cooperation to combat terrorism, Algeria provided deceptive and self-serving intelligence about terrorist modus operandi within its territories to participating members, Morocco among them, and the U.S. Morocco’s cooperation, by contrast, was impeccable.
The benefits to be accrued by the Moroccan government outweigh the risks. Militarily, Morocco will have added access to U.S. military provision programs allowing it to upgrade it military hardware. Under the auspices of the Foreign Military Training Programs, its military personnel will benefit from the advanced training courses U.S. military schools and academies offer; in fact, Moroccan intelligence officers are already training in U.S. military schools such as Ft. Huachuca, AZ and Quantico, VA. The U.S. DoD will also provide funding to refurbish Moroccan bases, ports, and airfields. The Moroccan coast guard will gain the assistance of the U.S. navy in its interdiction operations in the Strait of Gibraltar. The government’s offensive against Islamic extremist cells will also stand to benefit from U.S. intelligence capabilities and U.S. funds set specifically for anti-terrorism operations in Africa. Other agencies, such as U.S.AID, governed by the U.S. Department of State will be involved, providing a much needed boost to social and economic reforms. Overall, the establishment of AFRICOM in Morocco will stabilize the region and foster an environment friendly to foreign investment and conducive to economic growth.
By May, 2007, Libya and Algeria’s vocal opposition to the U.S. project prompted the Moroccan government to categorically deny its involvement. Even the U.S., through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Teresa Whelan, announced that it will have no bases and will not be deploying any forces on the continent. Morocco’s denial is understandably driven by the fact that it does not want to be seen as a Washington Pawn. The stanch opposition of Libya and Algeria to Morocco being a host to AFRICOM should have been expected, considering that the establishment of AFRICOM in Morocco will drastically alter the power symmetry in the region. Algeria’s campaign to discredit Morocco and deny it any regional strategic influence has started decades before AFRICOM’s existence. It is worth noting that the official visit of the U.S. commander of the sixth fleet to Algeria and the visits of the Algerian government leadership to Washington denote that the U.S. already has a vested interest in Algeria, particularly its oil rich southern regions where U.S. government personnel are already operationally established under the umbrella of the U.S.-Algeria Business Council. The project to establish AFRICOM headquarters in Morocco, namely in the outskirts of Tan Tan, was not cancelled; it became surreptitious. Morocco is still willing to host AFRICOM and the U.S. is serious in its consideration of Morocco, if not as a full-fledged home to the African command, as a regional command to a portion of the African area of operation (AO).
AND THE PROBLEM?
The Moroccan social and political fabric, much like that of any other country in Africa and the Arab world, is riddled with contradictions and problems some of which are remnants of the colonial era, others are outcomes of internal political and economic dysfunction, while some are destabilizing attempts by neighboring countries (Algeria, Libya, and Spain) and global terrorist organizations. The U.S. project, in order to succeed, will have to challenge the shameless venalities of some Moroccan officials. The Moroccan government itself no longer pretends that the rampant corruption problem within the Moroccan administrations does not exist and acknowledges that it stalls political, social and economic progress. There is a legitimate concern that the millions of dollars the U.S. will pour into programs designed to uplift Moroccans from the educational and financial poverty they are mired in will vanish into the pockets of the elite.
By its own doing, the Bush administration’s credibility in the Moroccan street, why! In the whole world, is mingled beyond recognition. U.S. Foreign Service employees in Arab and Moslem countries, from the highest echelons to the lowest ones, experience first hand and on a daily basis the reactions of the street to the White House’s lopsided foreign policies. While it advocates democratic ideals, the U.S. government arms and finances the Arab dictatorships and turns a blind eye on their oppression of their citizenry for the sake of an undemocratic stability. It is no wonder then that a large segment of the Moroccan intellectual sphere contends that the intentions of the U.S. government are not different from those of the colonial Europe in the previous century; it will delude Morocco of its riches, enlarge the already phenomenal class schism, and create additional regional conflicts.
Ahmed T. B. Copyright © 2008
A new brand of Moroccan immigrants is surfacing these days: the Moslem integrists purveying death and mayhem in Iraq. A New analysis from the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. entitled “Al-Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A first Look at the Sinjar Records” indicates that 50 Moroccans have crossed the Syrian border into Iraq between August 2006 and September 2007. The analysis was based on a trove of documents and 5 terabytes of data recovered by U.S. forces during a raid last September on a tent camp of an al-Qaeda cell in charge of transiting fighters in and out of Iraq. The camp was located in the wind-raked desert near Sinjar, a town near the Syrian/Iraqi border. 
