A Moroccan About the world around him

September 5, 2008

The Ailing Moroccan Security

Filed under: MAROC, MOROCCAN JUSTICE, MOROCCO, Terrorism — cabalamuse @ 9:53 pm
Tags:

 

The dismantlement by the Moroccan authorities of a homegrown terrorist group flauntingly calling itself “Fath Al Andalus” (Conquest of Andalusia) is laudable. Fifteen members of the group were arrested with chemicals, explosives, and a plan to conduct attacks in various cities in Morocco in the near future. According to reports from the Moroccan Territorial Security Department (TSD) and the National Security General Directorate (NSGD), the group is linked to Al Qaeda which according to the same sources provided financial and logistical support to the group’s operations. The Moroccan security elements, both at the strategic and tactical levels, are deft at following up on leads once they emerge;  their human and technical capabilities are impressive.  But the existence of such a group is one of many alarming indicators that disprove the government’s claim as echoed through its sanctioned and covert media outlets that the security situation in Morocco is secure.

The stark reality of national security is that it requires a consortium of all governmental and private constituents of the country; it is not a responsibility to be harnessed solely on the TSD and the NSGD whose gargantuan efforts are frequently felled by a myriad of stubborn national and local issues that demand protracted government policies and a resilient execution. One such issue is the porous Moroccan/Algerian border. An article in the daily newspaper Al Sabah reported that a recent Moroccan Ministry of Defense Inspector General visit to outposts along the security belt in the southern zone found that many of the inspected outposts were either undermanned or totally deserted. The inspection also determined that the soldiers assigned to those positions were complacent and poorly equipped. Numerous national newspapers and magazines described a sprawling black market offering everything from candy, biscuits, and cigarettes to clothing, electronic equipment, and fuel. Along with consumer goods locally and internationally produced drugs find their way to Moroccan, Algerian, and European users. Smugglers have been operating along the Algerian/Moroccan border for decades, but it’s only recently that they extended their services to support terrorist organizations such as “Fath Al Andalus.”Government officials from the low ranking border patrol guard to high ranking commanders and judges are complicit in the smuggling operations. In Moroccan cities and villages, local officials sell to high bidders residency certificates and other official documents necessary to obtain a Moroccan identification card; This week, a passport official in Mohamedia was arrested for selling a number of blank Moroccan passports. It is a known terrorist modus operandi to strive on such activity to establish operations support bases in different regions; one such cell was recently dismantled in the Souss region. Such lapses of government officials in different administrations, although they acutely impact the efforts of the thinly stretched TSD and NSGD, are never perpetrated to undermine an already floundering national security. They are driven by a frail national economy in which the poverty base exponentially increases by the day and the cost of living has grown unaffordable for the majority of the population.

Ahmed T. B. Copyright © 2008                

3 Comments »

  1. Actually I have been asking myself lately how come Morocco announces the arrests of more groups, and more frequently, than any other Arab country does, including Yemen, Algeria and Egypt. Is it really that bad in Morocco? Are Moroccan intelligence agencies that good? I have no doubt about how good they are in collecting HUMINT in Morocco and Western Europe, but I doubt that things are really that bad in Morocco. For obvious reasons Morocco would strategically benefit from highlighting, and even exaggerating, the terrorist threat inside Morocco, especially when it comes to its relationship with the U.S. The evidence is that, most often than not, those said terror groups get arrested before they conduct any operation. In this case, two possible scenarios emerge. Scenario A is that those militants are manipulated by intelligence officers, leading them to think they are really working with some AQ leader in Europe or the Maghreb. Once the group reaches advanced phases of operation, they can be easily arrested with their hands in the jar. The security forces can then celebrate their achievement and the government can ask for more aid from the West, bolstering their position as THE regional ally against terror. Scenario B is that militant groups in Morocco are well infiltrated by Moroccan officers who can make a bust every 3 to 5 months or so at the slightest risks shown by the militant group in question. Belliraj group was the most enigmatic one, and it’s still not clear how many sides Belliraj was working for. The whole thing about belliraj raised so many questions, and the Interior Ministry was kept in the dark all along the investigation. The suspects were abducted from their houses and the Interior Ministry didn’t divulge the case to the public until some journalists were contacted by relatives on their cell phones, which were being tapped of course. This all might be the work of my far-fetched imagination, but it’s always good to ask questions and challenge the mind’s comfort.
    Great blog by the way.
    Thanks.

    Comment by adilski — September 6, 2008 @ 8:11 am | Reply

  2. Adil,
    I would hope that terrorist groups operating in Morocco are infiltrated by Moroccan counterintelligence and counterterrorism operatives.

    Comment by cabalamuse — September 8, 2008 @ 4:56 pm | Reply

  3. excellent and informative post !

    Comment by bt — October 24, 2008 @ 6:03 pm | Reply


RSS feed for comments on this post. TrackBack URI

Leave a comment

Blog at WordPress.com.