The recent political rift between Morocco and Iran was long overdue. Morocco ‘stand, far from being reactive, is deliberate and pragmatic. It was based on clear indicators as to Iran’s malign intent vis-à-vis Morocco. Unlike other Arab nations, especially Middle Eastern ones which, by virtue of their geographic proximity to Iran, are compelled to deal with it, Morocco can afford to forgo relations with the Islamic republic. This is not the first time the two countries have an axe to grind with each other; in 1981, Tehran ceased its diplomatic relations with Rabat for hosting the deposed Iranian shah. It took a decade for relations to thaw.
The past few years saw an expansion in economic cooperation between the two countries; Morocco’s strategic geographic location provided Iran with a launching pad to European markets; still, trade between Morocco and Iran did not surpass $20 million; chump change in both countries’ international trade revenues.
Some Analysts speculated that Morocco severed its diplomatic relations with Iran in response to the latter’s irredentist claim against its neighbor Bahrain. The Moroccan government did send a missive to Bahrain reemphasizing its solidarity with the government of King Hamad bin Issa Al-Khalifa. The move angered Tehran which summoned the Moroccan chargé d’affaire to forcefully express its disapprobation.
Other analysts contend that Morocco is being used as a proxy by Saudi Arabia and other Arab Sunni Gulf countries to weaken Iran’s influence in Arab countries. Saudi Arabia has been competing with Iran for strategic leadership in the Gulf. Adherents to the Shiite ideology in Saudi Arabia constitute 20 per cent of the population and are a powerful influencing element for Iran. In February 2009, thousands of Saudi Shiites protested what they labeled discriminatory and anti-Shiite actions by the Saudi government. Such demonstrations were unprecedented in the Saudi kingdom. Saudi intelligence believes the demonstrations were fomented by Iran.
Morocco’s foreign minister, Taib Fassi Fihri, presented yet another explanation to Morocco’s cessation of its diplomatic relations with Iran. He stated that Iranian officials and their missionaries have been actively proselytizing in Morocco using cultural activities as a cover. Their campaign to spread the Shiite ideology reached beyond Morocco’s borders to target Moroccan immigrants in Europe. Morocco considers such activities undermining to its religious fundamentals and interfering with its internal affairs. Iranian foreign minister Monouchehr Mottaki denied the accusation and called Morocco’s reaction a setback to Muslim unity and erosive to Palestinian support.
Taib Fassi Fihri ‘statement is euphemism for what Moroccan intelligence services labeled Iran’s offensive counterintelligence and Human intelligence operations to recruit sources and establish a clandestine operating base to advance its agenda in the region by threatening and intimidating the Moroccan government.
Iran’s hegemonic ambition has been robust since the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the ascendancy of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in December 1979. Undeniably, the new theocratic government was supported by millions of disgruntled Iranians who regarded the Shah as a pampered puppet of the United States. Because of its radical ideology that called – and to a certain extent still does – for the overthrow of capitalism and American influence in the Middle East, Khomeiny’s regime found his oil and gas rich neighbors rather apprehensive. The fledgeling Shiite fundamentalist government engaged in aggressive intelligence operations in the Gulf countries; it was driven by a single requirement: survival. Saddam’s war against Iran was largely financed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The United States provided tremendous logistical and intelligence support. The strategic aim was to deflect Iran’s exporting of its ideology to neighboring countries and to deplete its economic and military resources, thus making it less of an influence on the balance of power not just in the region, but worldwide. The Middle Eastern countries rely heavily on U.S. support to keep Iran at bay. U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet in Bahrain, CENTCOM’s prepositioning bases in Qatar, and USAFCENT’s bases in Oman and United Arab Emirates constitute a powerful deterrent to Iran’s regional political and military ambitions.
Iran’s foreign agenda has weakened its economy; inflation exceeds twenty-five percent; forty percent of Iranians under thirty years of age are unemployed; the country imports forty percent of it domestic oil consumption; the business sector is heavily subsidized. Despite its current social and economic woes, Iran remains a serious contender in the international scene. So much so that The U.S. is now realizing that peace in Iraq will not be achieved without the active cooperation of Iran. Iranian influence on the dynamics of Iraqi politics is such that most Iraqi powerbrokers are believed to be on the payroll of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). In April, 2003, when U.S. forces entered Iraq, Iran had an established sprawling network of intelligence agents and thousands of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF) operatives standing by to unleash havoc across Iraq by training, advising, supplying, and directing Shiite groups. The tactical sophistication of Iraqi Shiite led insurgency operations and the advanced and effective weaponry they used, such as the devastating Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFP) and the Misagh-1 MANPADS, were trademarked in Iran. Iran’s covert operations in Iraq were not intended solely against the United States; they conducted countless assassinations and bombings against Iraqi political groups they deemed unresponsive to their scheme. In southern Lebanon and Palestine, Hezbollah and Hamas surged as a resistance force to reckon with. Their armed wings, the Islamic Resistance and Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, have been trained and equipped by IRGC-QF and their political leaderships mostly advised and financed by the MOIS. They drive a wedge in the region’s political mosaic and blatantly echo Iran’s political rhetoric and advocate its agenda. The potency of Iran’s radicalism and subversiveness became undisputable during the July 2006 war and the January 2009 Israeli attacks on Hamas.
Iran’s recent assertive PR campaign against Israel propelled it as a staunch defender of the Palestinian cause in the Arab street. The Arab governments’ abject failure to adequately address Israel’s murderous attacks against Gaza boosted Iran’s popularity not only among Shiite Arabs, but Sunni ones as well. To maximize on its popularity and the anti-Israeli sentiment permeating the Arab and Muslim world, Iranian diplomatic missions stepped-up their activities in Arab countries, including Morocco. Using Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza as templates, the Iranian mission in Morocco uses proxies to provide social services, operate regular schools, hawzas, and hospitals, and provide financial assistance to small businesses and farmers. It establishes Iranian financial institutions claiming to enhance trade between the two countries. It provides Arab youths academic opportunities in Iranian universities. In fact, the Iranian social, educational, and financial programs are far from being philanthropic. They are covers for a well structured counterintelligence human intelligence operational cycle Iran has tested time and again in many other countries. It uses them to imbue the population with its brand of insurrectionist Shiite ideology; once the population is indoctrinated, Iran establishes operating bases that will provide safe houses, training camps, weapons, transportation, and finances; it creates front companies and associations; it starts spotting and assessing for sources in key official position and political parties to influence the government’s decision-making process. Once it takes hold, it would be difficult to deter Iranian influence and stop its meddling in Moroccan politics. A hezbollah or Hamas-like organization inside Morocco would be a deleterious threat to Moroccan sovereignty and divisive to its social fabric.
Albeit necessary, Morocco’s uncompromising strategy in countering the Iranian threat to Morocco’s national unity might backfire by pushing Iranian operatives and their Moroccan backers underground making them far more challenging to expose and neutralize. Iranian intelligence could also redirect its support to Polisario and work in concert with the group to weaken Morocco’s territorial integrity.
A. T. B. Copyright © 2009