Morocco’s Military: Too Conventional For Today’s Asymmetric Threat

To enhance its air combat and air defense capabilities, the Moroccan Royal Air Force (RAF) had requested from and was approved by the United States Congress to purchase AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air missiles (AMRAAM) from Raytheon, a U.S. company specializing in Defense technology. Some sources reported that Morocco’s purchase request and commitment was for 96 missiles; other sources reported a much lower number. AMRAAM will allow RAF to maximize on the operational capabilities of its recently purchased F-16 Block 52+ aircraft.

AMRAAM costs $1.1 million each. It weighs 154.22 kilograms and has a range of 70 kilometers. Its air-to-air and surface launch dual application as well as its increased lethality makes it an attractive acquisition despite the fact that its precursors, AIM-7 and AIM-9, fared poorly in combat. Only 28% of the 88 AIM-7 fired during the 1991 Gulf War hit their targets. The combat tests of the AIM-9 Sidewinder, an improved version of the AIM-7, were even less impressive; of the 97 missiles fired, only 12.6% hit their targets. AMRAAM has been insufficiently tested. Only 13 missiles were fired in a combat environment. However, the results were positive; 77% hit their targets.

To increase interoperability with its European allies and U.S. military services and combatant commands – specifically AFRICOM and EUCOM, Morocco has made substantial military hardware and weapons upgrades in recent years. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) indicated in its 2009 report, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations,” that Morocco has signed $5.4 billion worth of arms contracts with U.S. companies. In the Arab World, it is surpassed only by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In addition to the AMRAAM and the 24 F-16 Block 52+ aircraft, Morocco has signed a $30 million contract with Lockheed Martin for the purchase of AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER Advanced Targeting Pods (ATPs) with Ground Stations. The SNIPER ATPs will provide the F-16 aircraft with non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (NT-ISR) capabilities. The long range positive identification of targets will boost the accuracy of the AMRAAM and complement command and control functions. Previously, Morocco was approved for a procurement package worth $187 million which includes 16 Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) Pods with four Ground Stations, 28 AGM-65(D and H) Maverick missile, 60 enhanced Guided Bomb Unit-12 (GBU-12) Paveway II, 28 M-61 vulcan cannons, 28 AN/ARC-238 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radios with HAVEQUICK I/II or SATURN I/II, eight Joint Mission Planning Systems, two Remote Operated Video Enhanced Receivers, 30 AN/ALR-93 Radar Warning Receivers, and 30 AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Goggles. Additionally, RAF bought 3 CH-47D Chinook helicopters equipped with AN/ARC-201E Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS); the Chinook helicopter package was estimated at $134 million. In 2007, to upgrade its artillery capabilities and enhance its armored combat support, Morocco bought 60 M109A5 155mm self-propelled howitzers in a “as-is-where-is” condition as well as associated equipment and services; the estimated cost of the package is $29 million, a discounted price.

Morocco has signed purchase contracts with European arms providers as well. In 2008, RAF bought 4 C-27J tactical transport aircraft from Alenia Aeronautica, a Finmeccanica company. Netherlands’ Schelde Naval Shipbuilding of the DAMEN Shipyards Group was contracted by the Moroccan Royal Navy to design, build, and delivery three SIGMA-class Multi-Mission Frigates equipped with state-of-the art Combat Systems including, but not limited to Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Surface Warfare (SuW), Anti-Air Warefare (AAW), and Electronic Warefare (EW) capabilities. A multi-mission frigate (Frégate Multi-Missions – FREMM) was ordered from France’s Direction des Constructions Navales (DCNS).

To widen the spectrum of security cooperation initiatives and promote regional stability, Morocco has signed tactical memorandums of understanding (TMOUs) with its regional allies, NATO, and USAFRICOM. The agreements are designed to facilitate the coordination and de-confliction of military and law enforcement operations; the objectives of these operations are to interdict human and drug trafficking, counter illegal immigration, and eliminate transnational terrorist and organized crime threats. To that effect, every year, Morocco participates in and hosts numerous iterations such as Exercise Phoenix Express, Operation Active Endeavour, Exercise Jebel Sahara, Exercise African Lion, Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), and others. These operations are opportunities for Morocco and its allies to review and update lessons learned and reinforce joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

General Ahmed Anejjar, CG of Moroccan Infantry, presenting Wissam Al Istihkak Al Askari’ on behalf of King Mohammed VI to Lieutenant Colonel John Perez, British Army, during Exercise Jebel Sahara 09

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, in its 2009 comprehensive assessment of military capabilities of 170 countries, ranked Morocco’s military third strongest force in Africa. Egypt’s is first and Algeria’s is a distant second. The assessment evaluated training, personnel, equipment, and defense economics. It is unconceivable that Maghreb countries will engage in a war. Despite the region’s low strategic value, the U.S. and Europe will not allow regional conflicts to escalate beyond diplomatic fracas. Morocco’s defense procurement binge – and Algeria’s as well – seems nonsensical. I believe that Morocco’s current strategy is one of deterrence rather than provocation. But such strategy is far removed from the reality of the security situation in the region.

It is my conviction that the conventional framework of Morocco’s military today is ineffective in addressing the asymmetric nature of today’s regional conflicts in which the enemy is decentralized, but highly symbiotic and the physical battlespace is irrelevant. The nature of unconventional warefare as conducted by terrorist and insurgency type elements like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is to alter the TTPs faster than operational templates can adapt. The Moroccan military will then be denied a specific operational template upon which to base a proactive response. The low operations tempo of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb today is not a reflection of the effective security measures implemented by local governments, the conventional strength of their militaries, or their regional interactions with western militaries. It is due to the fact that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is focused on providing support to insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and reinforcing Islamic extremist groups in Somalia. It is only a matter of time before Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or any of its proxies, their ranks bolstered by battle-tested Moroccan extremists, refocused their operational effort to destabilize the region by conducting tactical and strategic assassinations of political and military leadership, extensive propaganda operations targeting military and security personnel, and large scale criminal activity targeting the civilian population to discredit the police force. Such methods have been tested in Chechnya, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan; they have been proven to seriously affect policy. They forced the U.S. in Iraq to make concessions to the Iraqi insurgency and seek dialogue with Taliban in Afghanistan.

A. T. B. Copyright © 2009

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